



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

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What Future for Eastern Europe?

by Emil Lengyel

The broad belt of countries extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea in Eastern Europe represents an important front in the cold war. For the United States this is a Soviet salient into the core of Europe. Yet the aid we gave the Hungarian fighters in 1956 was moral, not military.

Indirectly, our stand in Eastern Europe implies a recognition of Russia's special interests there. This can best be seen by a comparison of our policies in Eastern Europe and in the Middle East, another sensitive region. In the Middle East we are committed to action through the Truman and Eisenhower doctrines and by our sponsorship of the Baghdad pact. We have no such commitments in Eastern Europe.

Eastern Europe's priority in thoughtful diplomatic planning was given full weight by scholarly former diplomat George F. Kennan in his Reith lecture series carried by the British Broadcasting Corporation. It is Mr. Kennan's thesis that the problems of Eastern Europe and Germany are linked; that both Germany and the Soviet satellite countries should be neutralized; and that Soviet and American forces should withdraw from these

areas. Neither the Germans nor the present satellites would participate in military blocs. "It is plain," said Kennan, "that there can be no Soviet military withdrawal from Eastern Europe unless this entire area can in some way be removed as an object of military rivalry of the great powers."

The U.S.S.R., meanwhile, has offered to withdraw its troops from the "German Democratic Republic" of East Germany and other satellites in return for the withdrawal of the forces of the United States, Britain and France from West Germany and other NATO-member countries. Premier Nikolai A. Bulganin has also proposed that all of Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia should not be used as sites for nuclear weapons.

The writer of this article found a great sense of urgency about the explosive Eastern European situation during a recent trip from one end of Europe to the other, including some satellite nations. The question was often asked whether one could expect to talk sensibly with the Russians on this issue. It was recognized, especially by people who had had personal experience with the Russians, that this was no easy task.

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The record shows, however, that the U.S.S.R. is not inflexible where changed conditions affecting its interests compel it to take a new look. A dramatic illustration of this was provided by Moscow's policy in Austria. That country was under the same four-power occupation as Germany, and all attempts at terminating this regime had run against Soviet obstinacy. Then, in the spring of 1955 the Kremlin decided to take a new look at this problem, and it acted with such dispatch that on May 15 a state treaty was signed, terminating four-power rule. The state treaty proclaimed Austria's perpetual neutrality, saying: "Austria will never join a military alliance or allow the establishment of military bases of foreign states in its territory."

Compromise on Austria

Thus the Russians accepted Austria's neutrality. This also happened to be in Austria's interest and, evidently, not detrimental to the cause of the Western allies. By withdrawing from Austria the Russians may have wanted to give the world an illustration of a *modus vivendi* between East and West. This they did in spite of the fact that nobody could deny Austria's strategic importance, demonstrated throughout the centuries, from the earliest days of the Hapsburgs to the Hitler regime. Did the Russians leave a fifth column behind? If so, the Austrians have not been able to find it. On the contrary, it was the formerly Soviet-held portion of Austria that gave an unprecedented welcome to the Hungarian

rebels. Nor is Austria neutral in ideology. It is committed to the West and has even joined the Western-oriented nations assembled in the Council of Europe.

Where their interests demanded it, the Russians have compromised in other parts of Europe, too. In spite of the fact that Finland is adjacent to the U.S.S.R., it has been able to pursue its own foreign policy and on several occasions has even voted against the Kremlin in the United Nations. It cannot, of course, participate in military blocs. More recently, Russia's hold on Poland has also been relaxed.

But what about Hungary, whose dreams of freedom were pulverized by Russian tanks? It is a matter of record that at one time the Russians were hesitating about their next step in the Hungarian uprising. The objective historian of the future may find that Hungary's Premier Imre Nagy failed to see how far he could go. He wanted to gain Hungary's full freedom of action with a stroke of the pen, when he proclaimed its neutrality in a declaration which he invited the four great powers to guarantee. Three of these powers were members of NATO—the United States, Britain and France. The U.S.S.R. may have felt that this was tantamount to inviting NATO into its own backyard.

The question today is whether the "Austrian solution" is possible in Eastern Europe. Are the Russians ready to talk with us in terms of that pattern? Here are a few facts that may enter into their calculations. In

order to keep Hungary quiet they have had to pour more than a quarter of a billion dollars into its economy in the last few months, and we do not know how many hundreds of millions they have had to inject into the shrinking budgets of their other satellites. Also, the Russians may have learned that Eastern Europe has for them become a formidable liability. Austria may have been the first step in a broader plan, the execution of which was thwarted by subsequent events. The Soviet leaders know, too, that another brush fire in this region may become a global conflagration. For these reasons and others unknown to us the U.S.S.R. may be ready to follow up on the dramatic change that occurred in its attitude toward Austria nearly two years ago. Neutralization, as outlined by Kennan and as envisaged by many Europeans, could foreshadow a brighter future for Eastern Europe.

Neutralization Not Enough

Neutralization alone, however, would not be sufficient. In the past, Eastern Europe, which includes the proverbially troublesome Balkans, was the most dangerous power vacuum, inviting aggression because of the impotence of its small states. The region may be prevented from reverting to its previous condition only through a measure of integration, the natural beginning of which would be the elimination of economic rivalries. If there ever has been justification for a "common market" it is in this area, rich in natural resources

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Why U.S. Defense Must Be Reorganized

Are we going to get a reorganization—a real reorganization—of the Pentagon?

Every citizen's guess is as good as that of any expert, civilian or military. For any genuine reorganization is going to be a herculean task. And somebody must play the part of Hercules. So far there are no takers.

The task normally should be done by the President. And, for a moment, in his State of the Union message it sounded as if President Eisenhower was warming up for the role. He was cheered to the echo when he declared that "harmful service rivalries" must be stopped. Congressmen clapped loudly when he said that the military organization must "facilitate rather than hinder" national security. They beamed when he asserted he had some ideas on reorganization that would "soon be finalized."

President Hesitant

But less than a week later the President told the first press conference since his illness that while he had some pretty positive views on Pentagon reorganization, he was not going to lead the fight. There must, he said, be "a consensus" with the Cabinet, with Congress, with the military. If the consensus does not go "in the direction of what I believe" he declared, "then I couldn't possibly have anything to do with it." It would thus seem that the President does not plan to take charge of the herculean task. Knowing his rather strong personal views on inter-service rivalry and his own frustrations as Army Chief of Staff, many a Capital observer could not believe his ears when the Commander-in-chief passed up this transcendent

assignment of first importance.

But if the President is determined to decline this crucial task, there are others daring to rush in where Presidents fear to tread. Both the Gaither committee, an official study group, and the Rockefeller panel of 50 private citizens have put the Pentagon under the microscope of some of the country's best minds and come up with almost identical conclusions. The present military arrangement, in their opinion, is bad, if not actually dangerous. New weapons are being placed in a strait jacket of obsolete missions. There is no global military planning staff such as the critical times require. While the Gaither report is apparently going to remain top secret (the President is reported to have said that its findings are more than the public could stomach), this is not true of the Rockefeller report which has become a best seller and says out loud what the Gaither report has said in secret.

What's Wrong?

That there is something out of joint in the Defense Department seems obvious from what committees and individuals are saying—people whose reputations for loyalty, integrity and sincerity are surpassed by none. Some of these statements appear on pages 85-87 of this BULLETIN.

So it is not just a few crackpots, hotheads, frustrated politicians or jealous generals who are calling for, even demanding, a real reorganization of the Pentagon.

The trouble with those who, like Admiral Arleigh A. Burke and General Nathan F. Twining, are fighting reorganization tooth and nail is that they strangle themselves with their

own strictures. Admiral Burke "shudders with fear at the thought of submitting his opinions to one single wise man"—but isn't that just what he is doing as regards the President? General Twining denounces critics of America's present defense posture and structure, suggesting they are playing the Communist game. But has not the public accepted the President's leadership these last five years only to find that the Russians either have passed, or are overtaking, us in rockets and missiles? The public had no warning and no reason to believe the Russians were so far advanced. The public was put to sleep by official reassurances—not caught asleep.

But why is a reorganization of the Defense Department necessary? First, because the present system obviously is not working. Second, it is, as General Omar Bradley says, as out of date as the horse and buggy. Third, it is unquestionably pouring millions if not billions down unnecessary rat holes. Fourth, missile-age warfare willy-nilly has fouled up all historic concepts of service roles and missions. And, a possible fifth reason, there needs to be a strategic military planning staff divorced from the separate services to consider national security as a single problem. For all their protests, the present Chiefs of Staff of the services cannot but be champions of their own branches—which becomes all too obvious as they battle for the billions and maneuver to capture every kind of mission and missile.

In Washington observers are convinced that reorganization is an absolute essential. The question is, Will the country get it?

NEAL STANFORD



What U.S. Economic Policy for Survival?

Second only to the shock of discovering on October 4 that the U.S.S.R. has the capacity to put satellites in outer space and to produce ICBM's was the shock produced by the publication on January 14 of a State Department study showing the amount and outreach of Soviet economic aid to underdeveloped countries.

Extent of Soviet Aid

Until recently the State Department had given the impression that the Soviet bloc had been bluffing when it promised economic aid to underdeveloped countries; that it would prove unable to deliver on its promissory notes; and that its aid was trifling as compared with ours.

The study published on January 14, however, bluntly states that in the past two and a half years the U.S.S.R. has agreed to provide ten underdeveloped nations (Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ceylon, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Syria, Yemen and Yugoslavia) with \$1.5 billion in economic aid as compared with Washington's total of \$900 million for the same period and in the same area. The Soviet bloc has begun the fulfillment of agreements "with considerable dispatch," and generally programs have been carried out on schedule. Certain countries were "wary" of accepting too many Soviet technicians because they recognized "the potential for subversive activities," but the behavior of Soviet bloc technicians "so far has given rise to few complaints," says the State Department.

Most of the aid given by the Soviet bloc has been in the form of long-term loans (a method of aid increasingly recommended by American ex-

perts) at the low interest of 2.5 percent, and in one case at least—Yemen—1 percent, as compared with the United States rate of 3 to over 5 percent. Repayment to Russia is usually to be made in the form of commodities or local currencies, or both—a procedure far more workable for underdeveloped countries than repayment in hard currencies such as dollars or pounds sterling, of which they have limited amounts or none.

The bulk of Soviet aid has gone toward the industrialization of recipient nations, either through small industries or through a few large enterprises such as the steel mill Russia is building for India, an aluminum plant for Yugoslavia, and an oil refinery that Czechoslovakia has undertaken to build for Syria. By contrast, the American aid program has concentrated available funds on modernization of agriculture, and improvement of public health and education. The Soviet bloc has succeeded in providing some 2,000 technicians for 19 countries. For both men and machinery it has drawn not only on the resources of Russia, but also of Eastern Europe, notably highly industrialized Czechoslovakia. Communist China has given a total of \$55 million to Cambodia and Nepal.

Is Soviet Aid a Threat?

From the point of view of the United States, Soviet bloc economic aid, which is now admitted to be substantial and growing, is a threat to the West—perhaps a greater threat in the long run than military aggression. This is the view taken by many officials, Congressmen, and newspaper commentators, who often

say that Moscow is using aid to "blackmail" the West. That, however, is not the view of the underdeveloped countries, which, irrespective of what they think about communism, are confronted with grave problems in their efforts to modernize their backward, primarily agrarian economies and to improve the wretchedly low living standards of their peoples.

These countries are caught on the horns of a harsh dilemma. If they are to make even the most modest advances, they must import the capital goods and technicians they lack. But they must pay for these imports—and unless they can pay with the commodities they produce and/or local currencies, they must resign themselves to accepting grants from industrial nations. These grants, whether outright gifts or loans, are in effect handouts, for the recipient nations, at their low stage of economic development, have little hope of repaying loans in hard currencies. And a prolonged diet of handouts tends to undermine the moral stamina of the recipients, who begin to regard such aid—received primarily from the United States—as their due.

Hard Questions for U.S.

Will it be possible for Washington, under the impact of Soviet aid, to review without sentimentality and illusions its foreign economic policy as a whole, instead of discussing, as we now do, future plans for aid and trade haphazardly and in piecemeal fashion? In such a discussion several hard questions need to be raised and answered:

1. *Are we really giving the under-*

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Should Pentagon Be Reorganized?

Sharp differences of opinion have emerged about the need for reorganization of the Pentagon as well as about the form it should take. Here are some of the principal statements pro and con.

From the text of President Eisenhower's Message to Congress on the State of the Union on January 9 in The New York Times of January 10.

THE first need is to assure ourselves that military organization facilitates rather than hinders the functioning of the military establishment in maintaining the security of the nation.

Since World War II, the purpose of achieving maximum organizational efficiency in a modern defense establishment has several times occasioned action by the Congress and by the Executive.

The advent of revolutionary new devices, bringing with them the problem of over-all continental defense, creates new difficulties, reminiscent of those attending the advent of the airplane more than half a century ago.

Some of the important new weapons which technology has produced do not fit into any existing service pattern. They cut across all services, involve all services and transcend all services, at every stage, from development to operation. In some instances they defy classification according to branch of service.

Unfortunately, the uncertainties resulting from such a situation, and the jurisdictional disputes attending upon it, tend to bewilder and confuse the public and create the impression that service differences are damaging the national interest.

Now, let us by all means proudly remember that the members of the armed forces give their basic and first allegiance solely to the United

States. Of that fact all of us are certain. But pride of service and mistaken zeal in promoting particular doctrine has more than once occasioned the kind of difficulty of which I have just spoken.

Plans Separate Message

I am not attempting today to pass judgment on the charge of harmful service rivalries. But one thing is sure. Whatever they are, America wants them stopped.

Recently I have had under special study with the intimate association of Secretary [Neil H.] McElroy "the never-ending problem of efficient organization, complicated as it is by these new weapons. Soon my conclusions will be finalized. I shall promptly take such executive action as is necessary and, in a separate message, I shall present appropriate recommendations to the Congress.

Meanwhile, without anticipating the detailed form that a reorganization should take, I can state its main lines in terms of objectives:

A major purpose of military organization is to achieve real unity in the defense establishment in all the principal features of military activity. Of all these one of the most important to our nation's security is strategic planning and direction. This work must be done under unified direction.

The defense establishment must plan for a better integration of its defensive resources, particularly with respect to the newer weapons now building and under development. These obviously require full coordination in their development, produc-

tion and use. Good organization can help assure such coordination.

In recognition of the need for single control in some of our most advanced development projects, the Secretary of Defense has already decided to concentrate into one organization all antimissile and satellite technology undertaken within the Department of Defense.

Another requirement of military organization is a clear subordination of the military services to duly constituted civilian authority. This control must be real; not merely on the surface.

Next there must be assurance that an excessive number of compartments in organization will not create costly and confusing compartments in our scientific and industrial effort.

Finally, to end interservice disputes requires clear organization and decisive central direction, supported by the unstinted cooperation of every individual in the defense establishment, civilian and military.

From the transcript of President Eisenhower's news conference of January 15 in The New York Times of January 16.

Since 1947, I have given many, many active hours to this kind of study [about unification of armed services]. I have reviewed the whole military record as I have known it for 45 years and, therefore, I think my views are completely objective and with nothing whatsoever of personal bias in them.

But I have this: I am the Commander-in-chief for a fixed period, and at least we know that I am not

going to be in this job more than three years.

Now, my personal convictions, no matter how strong, cannot be the final answer. There must be a consensus reached with the cab—with the Congress, with the people that have the job of operating the services to get the very finest kind of organization we can; and I am certainly hopeful that it goes in the direction of what I believe; but I would be the last to ask for a detailed organization in which I believe because, I think, say, organization has got to be effective after there has passed from the scene a man who happens to have particular strong convictions in the matter.

Q.—You are not saying sir, or are you, that you will not fight for unification of the services?

A.—Well, now, just a minute. I don't know who you are fighting. I am trying to put before the Congress a plan which I think will be effective, and certainly in the discussions and many conferences that will go on in the formulation of the plan that I have in mind, there will be a good deal of argument, no question about it, and my views will certainly be expressed to the very best I can; and, as I say, if the trend and tendency is not in that direction, then I couldn't possibly have anything to do with it.

From excerpts of Lieut. Gen. James H. Doolittle's testimony before the Senate Preparedness subcommittee on November 26, 1957 in The New York Times of November 27, 1957.

I do not believe that the present system is properly designed to employ with maximum effectiveness and minimum cost some of our new weapons and concepts.

I believe that some changes are required. Some can be made without legislation, some will require legislation.

I believe that the changes must be evolutionary, not revolutionary. Certainly at this time, we must not upset our military establishment and even momentarily assume a position of weakness.

There is much that is good in our present system. As a matter of fact, most of the things are good. They should certainly be saved, and in correcting faults we must be sure that we do not introduce new and more difficult problems.

Certainly we should eliminate wasteful duplication. I do not believe that all duplication is wasteful.

We must eliminate destructive competition, and again I do not believe that all competition is destructive. There is competition that is good.

I do not know—it may be that we are headed toward a single service in one uniform. I do not advocate it at this time, because I have not had an opportunity to study the entire matter through to conclusion.

A first step, it would seem to me, would be to strengthen the office of the Secretary of Defense. It seems to me that he should be provided with an advisory military staff to assist him in resolving the honest differences of opinion that now occur between dedicated military people.

Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, before the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., January 6, as excerpted in The New York Times on January 7.

And now to take up [a] subject fanned into fresh heat in recent weeks, the matter of military organization. It appears to me that this pressure toward reorganization is an illogical reaction to our not having an operational ballistic missile or satellite in the sky.

I have been watching with some concern as the several public pressures toward centralization and au-

thoritarianism in defense begin to mesh together to form a single pattern.

Every one of these proposals should be carefully examined. I would favor constructive changes, but, before we make any changes, let's be sure that they will actually improve our method of arriving at proper decisions. There are many things other than organization which contribute to the success or to the smooth operation of the decision-making process. The entire process is limited by human mentality. No matter how brilliant, no man is omniscient. There is no organizational or procedural means for removing that limitation.

There are pressures toward reorganization, and very vocal ones they are, too. The general themes are not new. This, gentlemen, is something you will clearly see on careful examination. There are proposals, all leading in one way or another toward more and more concentration of power, more and more autocracy by military policy and military decision, more and more suppression of differences of judgment, and more and more of what is described as "swift efficiency of decision" as a substitute for debate and discussion of the military aspects of national policy.

Is One Wiser Than Many?

I have been opposed to this before, and I am opposed to it now. I cannot and will not believe that military policy and military decision should control or limit national policy or national decision.

We are told that we need some better kind of military decision. Faster decision? Wiser decision? If we believe that one man, a military Solomon, is necessarily wiser than many men, then why not carry this logic further—why not carry it to its almost inevitable conclusion and abolish the Congress, make the people's elected Chief Executive a figurehead,

and place our future in the hands of a single military national protector?

We are told that we need an end to differences between the services. We are told that we should think and speak as one voice.

This is a very appealing conclusion when its proponents wheel up their semantic artillery. "Bickering" is scapegoat ammunition, so honest differences in judgment are called "bickering." "Argument" is a trigger-happy word, so discussion and consideration and debate and examination of these incredibly complex problems is called "argument."

You know the words and their connotations better than I do. But I would like to suggest that the other side of the coin has not been publicly examined with the same fervor and energy. And I point this out to you because this is your task. I urge you to take it on.

Excerpts from the text of the summary of a report on "International Security—The Military Aspect" made by Panel II of the Special Studies Project of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Inc., reprinted with permission of the fund.*

Defense Organization

The major defects in the present organization are inherent in its present structure. They will be further aggravated by the passage of time. These defects are three in number:

1. The roles and missions assigned to the individual military services have become competitive rather than complementary because they are out of accord with both weapons technology and the principal military threats to our national safety;

2. The present organization and responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff preclude the development of a comprehensive and coherent strategic doctrine for the United States. Since each member of the Joint Chiefs except the chairman is the senior officer of one of the military services, its status and morale can never be far from his mind. With the best will in the world he often becomes an advocate of a service point of view rather than an over-all planner;

3. The Secretary of Defense is so burdened with the negative tasks of trying to arbitrate and control inter-service disputes that he cannot play his full part in the initiation and development of high military policy.

The following changes are recommended:

(a) The military services should be removed from the channel of operational command. Freed from their responsibilities for strategic planning and combat operations, the service chiefs and their civilian superiors could concentrate on tasks of management and logistics.

(b) All of the operational military forces should be organized into unified commands to perform the missions which are called for by our strategic requirements. Each unified command would be a combined force with its own mission and trained to carry out a distinctive task.

(c) The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be designated Principal Military Adviser to the Secretary of Defense and the President. The chiefs of the several services would continue to serve on the Joint Chiefs of Staff but only as advisers to the chairman and with particular responsibility for the areas of logistics, training and procurement.

(d) The staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be organized on a unified basis and placed under the control of the chairman. A unified staff under the direct control of the chairman would remove many of the service pressures on the members of

the staff. The staff would assist the chairman in his capacity as Principal Military Adviser to the President and the Secretary of Defense in strategic and operational planning.

(e) All officers above the rank of brigadier general or equivalent should receive their permanent promotions from the Department of Defense and would become officers of the armed forces of the United States.

The procedure recommended here would retain the specialization necessary to command specific units and the morale which goes with membership in a service. At the higher levels, however, where the requirement is for an over-all view, the primary loyalty of all high-ranking officers would transcend service boundaries. Since entry into this group would be the goal of most if not *all* officers throughout their careers, junior officers would know that their future would depend on their ability to take a broad view, rather than on the ability to defend the point of view of their service on interdepartmental committees.

(f) The line of operational command should be from the President and the Secretary of Defense to the functional commanders through the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his capacity as Principal Military Adviser.

(g) The line of logistic command should be from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the secretaries of the three military departments.

(h) The Secretary of Defense should be given direct authority over all research, development and procurement. He should have the right of cancellation and transfer of service programs together with their appropriations. He should also be given a direct appropriation for the conduct of research and development programs at the Defense Department level.

* The full text of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund report, "International Security—The Military Aspect," *America at Mid-Century Series*, (New York, Doubleday, 1958), is obtainable in bookstores at 50 cents.

Lengyel

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and potential consumers. The incipient Western European common market would have to trade with the East in the common interest of prosperity and peace.

Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's proposal of January 4 for an East-West nonaggression pact would fit well into such an over-all picture. But a more permanent solution of East Europe's problem can be achieved only in the context of solutions of global problems.

Professor Emil Lengyel of New York University is the author of several books about Eastern Europe, including *1000 Years of Hungary* (to be published in March by John Day). He also wrote *Headline Series No. 77, "Eastern Europe Today"* (September-October, 1949), and is a frequent contributor to the *FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN*. This past summer he visited several Hungarian refugee camps in Austria.

Spotlight

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developed countries as much economic aid as we think? Those who say that we have a "give-away program" seldom stop to ask what it is we are giving away. Actually, the bulk of our aid is military, not economic, and most of the funds spent on economic aid in the past decade have gone to the already industrialized nations of Western Europe under the Marshall Plan, not to the newly independent lands of Asia,

Africa and the Middle East, where the Soviet bloc is concentrating its aid. Of the \$3.4 billion appropriated for the fiscal year 1957-58, \$2.029 billion is earmarked for direct military aid and defense support, and some of the President's special assistance fund of \$225 million will almost certainly go for essentially military purposes. By contrast, technical assistance amounts to only \$130 million, and the new Development Loan Fund got \$300 million instead of the \$500 million proposed by the President. Are we prepared to increase substantially the sum we allocate to economic aid?

2. *Is it true that Soviet aid is a threat to the West?* Charles Wolf, Jr., an American expert on technical assistance to Southeast Asia, contends that Soviet aid is not a threat but a "windfall." If, he argues, our object is to raise living standards in underdeveloped areas as rapidly as possible, then Soviet aid represents a gain, not a loss, for the United States. Moreover, competition in aid, to which the United States has been summoned by Communist boss Nikita S. Khrushchev, should appeal to our own avowed faith in competitiveness.

3. *Can we separate aid from trade? Are the United States and other Western industrial nations willing to accept repayment of loans to underdeveloped countries in the form of the goods they produce?* Can the

West substantially increase its markets for the rice of Burma, the cotton of Egypt, the sugar of Cuba, the products of other Latin American countries—not to speak of the exports of an industrial non-Western country, Japan?

If not, and if instead we yield to the many pleas for use of the "escape clause" in reciprocal trade agreements, then how can the United States, and the West in general, object to increased trade by the underdeveloped countries with the Soviet bloc and Communist China? True, the Communist countries can and do use trade for political purposes, but it is also true that they genuinely need the products of Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. Can the West indefinitely play the role of dog in the manger because it fears the political implications of Soviet trade? Or should it not, instead, reach a difficult decision? It will either have to reduce some sectors of its own production to make room for the exports of underdeveloped countries or else accept as an inescapable, if unpleasant reality, the fact that world trade is being rapidly reoriented by sheer necessity for markets rather than by Soviet blackmail.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(This is the sixth of eight articles on "Great Decisions . . . 1958"—What Should U.S. Do in a Changing World?"—a comprehensive review of American foreign policy.)

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